IAEA Confronts New Nuclear Challenge in Iran

The Nuclear Challenge: IAEA Faces New Dilemmas in Iran's Nuclear Program

In the escalating tensions between Washington and Tehran over whether international inspectors can verify Iran's compliance with nuclear non-proliferation commitments, former officials have shared insights with RFE/RL that the scale, scope, and level of access are critical factors for the success of inspections. However, details remain undefined, despite Raffael Grossi, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), indicating that the agency will "soon work on the modalities – the dates, procedures, locations."

Experts note this doesn't mean the organization lacks a wishlist for any future inspections. Laura Rockwood, a former IAEA negotiator on Iran, stated: "They almost certainly have a plan for when they go back, what the priorities are, where they want to go first, second, third." She emphasized the importance of identifying where enriched uranium is stored.

The Uranium Enrichment Reduction

While U.S. President Donald Trump claimed Iran had agreed to the highest level of nuclear inspections and Iran asserted there are no plans for inspections, Point 8 in the U.S.-Iran Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) affirms that both sides agreed on a "minimal approach" by which Iran's highly enriched uranium (HEU) would be "downblended on-site under IAEA supervision."

However, the details of this process could be contentious. Matthew Sharp, who was director for Iran nuclear matters on the U.S. National Security Council from 2021-2022, noted: "If IAEA inspectors can measure and quantify both the high and low enriched material before downblending, then the simple math would show what the product is. They would want to measure to confirm and seal that product for accountability in the future."

Conversely, if Iran performs the downblending itself and then provides the product to inspectors, it would be difficult to know how much HEU Iran started with, creating uncertainty about whether all 60%-enriched material has been downblended or if some remains outside of our control.

Monitoring Enrichment Activities

Currently, the location of Iran's approximately 450 kg of HEU remains unclear. Following U.S. and Israeli airstrikes, it may be buried under rubble in a mountain bunker, or Iranian authorities may have moved some or all of it to conceal it. However, if the location can be identified and downblended, the next step would be to prevent Iran from re-enriching it later.

The MOU affirms that both sides agreed to "discuss the enrichment issue and other agreed issues related to the nuclear needs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, based on an agreed framework in the final agreement." Experts emphasize that verification of this must include a role for the IAEA. Kelsey Davenport, director for nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association, stated: "Any suspension of uranium enrichment would be relatively meaningless if it cannot be verified and if the IAEA does not have access to ensure that no secret nuclear activities related to enrichment are taking place elsewhere in the country."

Lessons from History

Experts note that valuable lessons have been learned from past experiences. They point to the importance of the IAEA's Additional Protocol, which provides additional tools for verification. Rockwood, now a senior fellow at the Vienna-based Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Centre, was the principal author of this protocol. She explained: "Under the Additional Protocol, instead of being limited to nuclear material and nuclear facilities, we had access to information and locations related to the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including centrifuge production."

Iran signed the Additional Protocol in 2003 but has not sent a formal letter to the IAEA to bring it into force. Iran implemented its provisions provisionally between 2003 and 2006 and for a period under the JCPOA. However, Rockwood noted that "there were many signs of non-compliance by Iran" during this time, and this may continue—with additional complexities.

Clearly, there will be uncertainties, and there may be more uncertainties than before. "I really expect that to happen," Rockwood observed.

The Path Forward

These challenges highlight the urgent need for transparency and international oversight in an increasingly complex global security landscape. The success of any future nuclear agreement with Iran will depend on robust verification mechanisms that provide the IAEA with sufficient authority and access to ensure compliance.

The technical complexities involved in monitoring and verifying nuclear activities, particularly enrichment processes, require sophisticated approaches and constant adaptation to evolving technologies and concealment methods.

The international community faces a delicate balancing act: ensuring Iran cannot develop nuclear weapons while preserving diplomatic channels and avoiding military escalation. The technical and political challenges ahead require careful navigation and a commitment to verification that transcends political shifts.

As the situation continues to evolve, the IAEA's role as an independent technical body remains crucial in providing objective assessments and maintaining international confidence in the non-military nature of Iran's nuclear program. The challenges ahead are significant, but the stakes for global security make finding a sustainable solution imperative.